ss270-shipmates-stories3

RADM Jim Davis's, USN Ret interesting recollection of the Lapon vs Raton incident in the South China Sea on 27 May 1944 as reported in the January 1992 of Shipmate brought back similar memories that will remain forever etched in my memory bank.

The incident, from Lapan's vantage point, is very similar to that described by RADM Jim Davis, but is a variance on a few significant points. I was the Eaxecutive Officer and navigator of Lapon and my recollection is as follows:

Lapon had been patrolling an area in the South China Sea, north of Raton, from about 13 May to 23 May 1944 without having made any contacts. Lapon entered her South China Sea area through Balabac Strait North of Borneo and concentrated on the Palawan Passage area which had been fruitful in the past. Finally, nearing the end of our patrol, with no results we decided to proceed west and look for targets near the Singapore - Tokyo route and then return home via Kaimata Strat west of Borneo via the Java Sea. Forthunately, as we traveled west on 23 May smoke was sighted and the chase was on. Lapon, succeeded in attacking a two-ship convoy on 23-24 May in a series of night surface attacks expeending 20 torpedoes. These all night attacks resulted in sinking the two large AKAs and seeing the escorts retire. The next day, 24 May Lapon received an "ultra" message concerning a Japanese submarine, type unspecified, enroute from Singapore to Tokyo which would take her through Lapon's area. This message, unlike the Raton message, was not addressed to "Eyes only Jim Davis" so Lapon immediately set course and speed to intercept the Japanese submarine. We set up our attack plan on the assumption that the target would probably be running on the surface at night and submerged during the day. This assumption was based on the fact that she was carrying very important German radar scientists/technicians and valuable spare parts. To run the gauntlet of the great number of U. S. submarines between him and Tokyo on the surface during daylight didn't seem logical. In any event we assumed he would be making a trim dive in the dawning hours after an all night run.

The Lapon strategy was to compute his estimated down diving position from the information in the "ultra" and patrol submerged at that point at shallow depth across his projected track using the periscope and sweeping with the SJ radar in quick bursts. The possibility that the friendly submarine in the area to South would respond to the "Ultra" was not considered as it was beyond belief that Headquarters would send a submarine into a submarine occupied area without first telling the incumbent to pull clear. Further, Lapon had informed Headquarters the day before that she had sunk two ships, had four torpedoes left and her position at the time of the attacks. This position should have made it obvious to Headquarters that Lapon was in a position to intercept and would attack the Japanese submarine.

The foregoing is developed in some detail as it confirms in my mind that the Operations Department in Pearth really were asleep and couldn't have done a better job of setting up a potential catastrophic event as if that had been their intention.

As to the details of the attack, at about 0500 the periscope watch sighted what he thought was a sailboat. I immediately went to the conning tower from the chart desk in the control room and identified the target, which was appearing out of the first light of dawn as a submarine. After further observation, I identified it as Japanese when I saw what I believe were portholes. Unlike US submarines, many Japanese submarines had portholes installed in the bridge structure. Raton had a cut down bridge which was new and unfamiliar to the operating Perth boats. The effect was that what appeared to be portholes were openings through the bridge structure which the light of the false dawn was showing through. The identification was reinforced by the fact that the target was sighted on time, on the projected track, and at the expected dawn diving position as computed from the "ultra" message.

Lapon was immediately swung right to bring the four stern tubes to bear and an estimated set up put in the torpedo data computer (TDC). Range, speed and angle on the bow were all estimated and the tubes made ready. A four-shot speed was to be used. The attack was developing rapidly. At this time the Skipper "Steamie" Stone, took over the scope and made ready to fire. He agreed with the identification and adjusted the set up slightly and fired the first two torpedoes of the spread of four at which time he ordered "checkfire". I remonstrated saying that he was running the spread to which he replied "I think it's one of own." There was an immediate silence throught the boat and sonar was told to keep on the torpedoes in the water. Our estimates had indicated that the torpedo run to target should take a little over two minutes. At about four minutes we heard two explosions which checked out as end of run. "Steamie" said he could still see the target and his screws were also heard. The target changed course radically and went off at high speed. Lapon then went deep at silent running to reconstruct what had happened. The Japanese submarine could still be in the vicinity, and if so, would certainly be alerted by the explosions. When about one hour had passed the decision was made to go to periscope depth and search with radar, surface when all clear, and clear the area.

Upon regaining periscope depth and getting ready to surface a periscope was sighted on the starboard beam. Lapon immediately went deep, set silent running, changed course and continued a sonar search. The question of course, was the periscope sighting for real? If so, was it the Jap or was it the friendly sub?